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International law is often confronted with founda-
tional questions, for instance: how does international
law affect State behavior? Why would States pay any
attention to international law in the absence of coercive
enforcement mechanism as the primary tool used to
generate compliance in the national legal system? Does
international law is binding meanwhile States can al-
most always choose to violate it ? However, People
who study international law believe that international
law affect State conduct and it can usefully be deployed
to address serious problems among nations.
States efforts to come into compliance with international law are not limited
to the way they react to judicial decisions. States also have made changes to
domestic legislation in response to the demands of international agreements.
Further evidence of how international affect State behavior can be found by
examining individual States decisions and drawing inferences about whether
those decisions are motivated by relevant international rules.
This book seeks to contribute a comprehensive and theoretically sound of
international law from a rational choice of perspective. It also explains how
international law is able to constrain States, even when those states have no
intrinsic preference for compliance with the requirements of international law.
This book also explains how international law is able to affect State behavior
despite a lack of coercive enforcement mechanism. The theory developed in
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this book explains: Three Rs of Compliance - Reputation, Reciprocity and
Retaliation. In addition, this book also demonstrates that both bilateral and
multilateral agreements have the potential to influence State behavior, how States
choose between hard and soft law instruments, how substantive content and
form interact within an international agreement and why agreement vary so widely
in their scope and membership.
With respect to customary international law, the author shows that a ratio-
nal choice model of State behavior is fully consistent with customary legal rules
that affect the actions of States, and customary international law requires a
rethinking of some of the traditional doctrine approaches to the subject, includ-
ing the definition of customary international law and the role of State practice in
its creation.
The most theoretical discussion in this book is, how international law can
influence states. All of the foregoing evidence suggest that international law af-
fects the behavior of States in at least some instances and that international law
has an important role to play in facilitating cooperation among States.
Fundamental to understanding international law is die recognition that it is
just one of many factors that affect the incentives of States. International institu-
tions including international law are participants in international legal system that
influence the norms and attitudes of States.
This book is interested in questions relating to compliance with interna-
tional law and cooperation in international law affairs. Eventually, this book
focuses on international law more specifically on the primary sources of inter-
national law: treaties and customary international law. Furthermore, it also ex-
amines "soft law". This book, however, will not attempt to offer an expansive
theory of all forces that impact State behavior.
Chapter one discusses gives introduction on international law, methodol-
ogy used in this book (explainsfurther...), compliance and effectiveness in
International Law and the scope of the book.
Chapter two explains a general theory of International Law, the Three Rs
of compliance, international tribunals and States responsibility, payoffs and strat-
egies over time, modulating the level of commitment, coercion and international
agreements, and multilateral cooperation.
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Chapter three explains on the reputation. The author describes how repu-
tation is gained and lost, managing reputation over time, the role of information,
the compartmentalizing of reputation, and limits and caveats.
Chapter four discusses on International Agreements. The author explains
why States make agreements, matters of its forms, the interaction of form and
substance, the scope of agreements, membership in international agreements
and conclusion.
Chapter five elucidates on customary international law. The author describes
on the traditional definition of customary international law, rational choice crit-
ics, compliance and customary international law. opinion juris. State practice,
Pacta sunt servanda as an example of customary international law, and custom-
ary international law and other international law.
Chapter six is conclusion. In this chapter, the author mentioned, this book
seeks to develop general rational choice theory capable of explaining the sub-
ject. The basics of the theory are simple and rely on the three ways of violation
of international law can generate costs for a state. Three Rs: reputation, recip-
rocal non-compliance, and retaliation. Thus, a state that does not comply with
its international legal obligations may surfer because it finds it more difficult to
make credible international commitments or benefit from international law in the
future (reputation); because other states terminate their own compliance (reci-
procity); or because other States punish it, even when doing so is costly (retali-
ation). Each of the Three Rs of Compliance can increase the costs of violation
and therefore, promote cooperation.
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